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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNN) have been a de facto
standard for nowadays biometric recognition solu-
tions. A serious, but still overlooked problem in
these DNN-based recognition systems is their vul-
nerability against adversarial attacks. Adversar-
ial attacks can easily cause the output of a DNN
system to greatly distort with only tiny changes
in its input. Such distortions can potentially lead
to an unexpected match between a valid biometric
and a synthetic one constructed by a strategic at-
tacker, raising security issue. In this work, we show
how this issue can be resolved by learning robust
biometric features through a deep, information-
theoretic framework, which builds upon the recent
deep variational information bottleneck method but
is carefully adapted to biometric recognition tasks.
Empirical evaluation demonstrates that our method
not only offers stronger robustness against adver-
sarial attacks but also provides better recognition
performance over state-of-the-art approaches.
1 Introduction
Let us consider the following scenario in real-world biomet-
ric recognition. In particular, we will be focusing on the
case of deep biometric recognition, where deep neural net-
work (DNN) is employed as flexible feature extractors in the
database. Recognition is then done by comparing the distance
D between two biometric x1,x2 in the feature space:{
y1 = y2 if D(f(x1), f(x2)) ≤ T
y1 6= y2 if D(f(x1), f(x2)) > T (1)
where y denotes the identity (class) of the biometric, T is
the decision threshold, f : RK → Rk is the DNN used to ex-
tract features andD(·, ·) is some distance metric in the feature
space (e.g Euclidean distance or cosine distance). Therefore
two biometrics are considered to be matched with each other
if the distance between their features falls within T . Now as-
sume that a malicious attacker, who is also a valid user in the
system, is going to ‘masquerade’ some other person in the
∗corresponding author
same system. The question here is: can the attacker modify
his own biometric image x with only little efforts ∆x, so that
the system will mismatch him as some other user in the same
system? If the answer is yes, the attacker can then be granted
full authority belonged to that user —— a security disaster.
The above scenario is indeed not highly hypothetical due to
the advent of adversarial attacks in recent machine learning.
Adversarial attacks are algorithms designed to strike the sta-
bility of neural networks. Such algorithms can cause the out-
put of a neural network to greatly distort with only tiny vari-
ations in its input, leading to sub-optimal or even completely
wrong decisions [Szegedy et al., 2013]. For example, under
adversarial attacks, a well-trained deep neural network can be
fooled by a modified cookie picture and ridiculously classifies
it as a dog face. The source of adversarial attacks is still an
open problem [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016], but one thing is clear to us: it
alerts us to blindly adopting DNN in those security-sensitive
applications. Back to biometric recognition, if the output dis-
tortion caused by adversarial attacks are so large that it incurs
a unexpected match between the attacker’s biometric and that
of other users, security issue raises. Therefore, while offering
human-surpassing recognition performance, the robustness of
existing DNN-based recognition systems [Sun et al., 2014;
Amos et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2015] are indeed susceptible
and may need careful re-examination.
Very few efforts have been devoted to study the effect of
adversarial attacks in biometric recognition. In this work,
we investigate how adversarial attacks can raise serious se-
curity problems in existing deep biometric recognition sys-
tems as well as exploring its solution. We begin by extending
existing adversarial attacking algorithm from label space to
feature space and then use it to attack DNN-based biomet-
ric recognition system. We subsequently show that how this
kind of attacks can be effectively defended by a new deep
feature extraction framework, which is evolved from the re-
cent deep variational information bottleneck method [Alemi
et al., 2017] but is augmented with two improvements: a
novel sphere projection operation and an adversarial learning
strategy. The resultant method, which is coined as deep varia-
tional sphere projection (DVSP), provides both strong robust-
ness to adversarial attacks as well as satisfactory recognition
performance, hence is more preferable in real-world applica-
tions, as we confirm by extensive experiments.
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The rest of the paper are organized as follows. Section
2 formulates the problem as well as briefly introduces the
adversarial algorithm used to attack DNN-based biometric
recognition system. Section 3 elaborates the details of the
proposed DVSP framework. Section 4 conducts a set of ex-
periments on both the toy MNIST dataset and the real-world
LFW dataset. We finally conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 Problem formulation
Below, we first briefly revisit the background knowledge of
adversarial attacks in recent machine learning research, then
illustrate how to extend these attacks to the context of biomet-
ric recognition, which triggers the motivation of this work.
2.1 Adversarial attacks in label space
Generally speaking, given a classifier f(·) and two input im-
ages x1, x2 from different classes (e.g dogs v.s cats), adver-
sarial attacks seek x1’s minimal modified version x˜1 such that
it can cause f(·) to mis-classify x˜1 as x2. It can be formulated
as the following constrained optimization problem:
x˜1 = arg min
x
d(x,x1)
s.t. f(x˜1) = f(x2)
y1 6= y2
(2)
where d(·, ·) are some metric that measures the changes in
the classifier’s input space. We say that f(·) is vulnerable un-
der adversarial attacks if d(x˜1,x1) for the found x˜ is small.
Diverse attacking algorithms have been developed under dif-
ferent metric d; see e.g literature [Yuan et al., 2019] for a
recent review. In this work, we mainly focus on the case
d(x˜,x) = ‖x˜− x‖2 due to its popularity and simplicity.
2.2 Adversarial attacks in feature space
Existing works in adversarial attacks mainly consider the
classification scenario where f(x) outputs the class label i.e
it is defined in the label space. However it is indeed straight-
forward to extend them to the feature space. To see this, we
first relax (2) as:
x˜1 = arg min
x
‖x− x1‖2
s.t. D(f(x˜1), f(x2)) ≤ T
y1 6= y2
(3)
where D(·, ·) is a distance metric in the output space and T
is a threshold. One can see that if we broaden the family of
f(·) from classifier to feature extractor and pick appropriate
distance metricD(·, ·) we can immediately adapt existing ad-
versarial attacks to feature space.
Taking Carlini-Wanger attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017],
one of the most powerful adversarial attacking algorithm as
example, it originally finds x˜1 by optimizing a regularized
optimization problem (assuming that d(x˜,x) = ‖x˜− x‖2):
Jadv(x˜1) = ‖x1 − x˜1‖2 + λ ·max
i
|s(x1)i − s(x˜1)y2 |
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier and s(x) is the soft-
max scores of the classifier f(x). When adapting it to feature
space, we can replace the regularized term by e.g the cosine
distance between the extracted features:
J ′adv(x˜1) = ‖x1 − x˜1‖2 + λ · cos(f(x˜1), f(x2))
with which we can solve x˜1 by the same optimization pro-
cedure as before. Many other attacking algorithms in label
space can be adapted to feature space in a similar way.
Figure 1: A conceptual demonstration on how adversarial attacks
can be exploited to attack DNN-based biometric recognition sys-
tem. Solid items: valid biometric in the database. Empty items: fake
biometric constructed by adversarial attacks from the valid biomet-
ric. The dashed ellipsoids represent small T -balls in the two spaces.
While the difference between the original biometric and the adver-
sarial biometric is small in the original space, they are sufficient to
cause a mismatch in the feature space.
The existence of adversarial attacks in the feature space
clearly raises a prominent security problem for DNN-based
recognition systems: a strategic attacker may make use of
adversarial attacks to construct fake biometric from existing
ones whose features are close enough to that of other users
(Figure 1). If this is true, the attacker can be mis-recognized
as other users and be granted full authority belonging to oth-
ers. It is then natural to ask how to build a feature extractor
f(·) that are robust against adversarial attacks. Before an-
swering this question, we need a principle way to measure the
robustness of f(·) in the feature space, as existing robustness
evaluation metric [Huang et al., 2017; Bastani et al., 2016;
Carlini and Wagner, 2017] only work for the label space.
Here, we suggest to quantify the robustness of f(·) by the
‘hardness’ of finding x˜1 in (3):
H1,2(f) = 1
n1n2
∑
x1∈X1
∑
x2∈X2
inf
D(f(x˜1),f(x2))≤T
‖x˜1 − x1‖2
(4)
where X1 and X2 are the collection of biometric images be-
longing to individuals 1 and 2, n1, n2 are the cardinal of X1
andX2, respectively. Therefore we measure the robustness of
f(·) as the minimal effort required to make the system mis-
recognize x1 as x2 and average it across all (x1,x2) pairs.
Note thatH1,2(f) is defined for the binary-class case but it is
trivial to generalize it to multi-class case.
Our goal here is hence to design a feature extractor f(·)
with high robustness index (4) but still guarantees good
recognition performance. Next, we show that how this
goal can be achieved by learning robust biometric features
through a deep, information-theoretic framework, which is
evolved from the recent deep variational information bottle-
neck (DVIB) framework but are augmented with two impor-
tant modifications designed for biometric recognition tasks.
(a) Features in DVIB (b) Sphere projection (c) Adversarial learning (d) Resultant features
Figure 2: Demonstrating the feature extraction process of DVSP. Black dashed circles: the contour plot of r(z). Colored ellipses: contour
plot of p(z|x). Colored circles: contour of p(z′|x). Solid diamonds: the features in DVIB. Empty diamonds: the projected features in DVSP.
3 Method
From an information-theoretic perspective, if the extracted
features, Z, forget as much irrelevant information as possi-
ble in the input biometric X , then it shall be robust to small
permutations in the inputs. On the other hand, for good recog-
nition performance we hope that the learned features Z are
still informative about Y , the identity of the biometric owner.
Together, we can formulate an information-bottleneck (IB)
principle [Tishby et al., 2000] for feature extraction:
maximize L = I(Z;Y )− β · I(Z;X) (5)
Unfortunately, exact optimization of (5) is difficult due to
the intractable integrals in mutual information computation.
Below, we first show how to optimize (5) approximately by
the recent deep variational information bottleneck framework
(DVIB) [Alemi et al., 2017], then adapt it to biometric recog-
nition context.
3.1 Deep variational information bottleneck
Rather than optimizing (5) directly, DVIB suggests to instead
optimize its variational lower bound :
L ≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ep(z|xi)
[
log q(yi|z)
]
− βKL
[
p(z|xi)‖r(z)
]
(6)
where q(y|z) and q(z) are the variational approximations to
the distributions p(y|z) and p(z) respectively. See [Alemi et
al., 2017] for the derivation. In DVIB, these distributions are
modeled as:
p(z|x) = N (z;µ(x),Λ(x)), q(z) = N (z;0, I)
q(y = j|z) = e
gj(z)∑K
k=1 e
gk(z)
(7)
where the mean µ(x) and the covariance Λ(x) of p(z|x) are
computed by an encoder network f with weights Wf :
f(x;Wf ) = {µ(x),Λ(x)} (8)
whereas the softmax score gk(z) in q(y = j|z) is given by
another decoder network g with weights Wg:
g(z;Wg) = {gk(z)}Kk=1 (9)
The weights in the two networks f and g are then jointly
learned by optimizing (6). After training, we take µ(x) in
the encoder network as the features of x i.e z = µ(x).
3.2 Deep variational sphere projection
DVIB allows us to learn Z in (5) efficiently, however it
is originally designed for classification tasks rather than
biometric recognition. Mainstream biometric recognition
solutions usually learn biometric features with a large
inter-class margin explicitly so as to achieve good recog-
nition performance in (1) (see e.g [Chopra et al., 2005],
[Schroff et al., 2015], [Wen et al., 2016] and [Liu et al.,
2016]). In DVIB, however, µ(x) of each classes has to
stay near the origin due to the KL term in (6), making
their Euclidean distance too close to each other (Fig-
ure 2.a) and hence small inter-class margin. We introduce
two important modifications to DVIB to resolve this problem.
Sphere projection. The first modification is a novel projec-
tion operation. The idea is to ‘project’ the features in DVIB
to the surface of a hypersphere, where the projected features
are allowed to have large angular margin regardless of the
KL term (Figure 2.b). The projection operation is defined as:
z′ = R · z‖z‖ (10)
Therefore the new features z′ are on the surface of a hyper-
sphere whose center is at the origin and has radius R. Similar
to (5), we can set up an IB principle for learning Z ′:
maximize L′ = I(Z ′;Y )− β · I(Z ′;X) (11)
whose lower bound is:
L′ ≥ I(Z ′;Y )− β · I(Z;X)
≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ep(z′|xi)
[
log q(yi|z′)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
likelihood term
−β KL
[
p(z|xi)‖q(z)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KL term
(12)
The first inequality above is given by the data processing in-
equality and the second inequality is given by the variational
lower bound. Learning now amounts to optimizing (12) in-
stead of (6). Here, p(z′|x) is modeled as a special ‘shell dis-
tribution’ whose probability mass is uniformly spread on the
surface of a hypersphere:
p(z′|x)
{ ∝ 1, if ‖z′ − c(x)‖ = r(x)
= 0 otherwise (13)
Figure 3: An overview of the proposed DVSP framework for robust biometric features extraction.
and the center c(x) and radius r(x) of the hypersphere are:
c(x) = µ(x)/‖µ(x)‖, r(x) = 1
k
k∑
i=1
Λi,i(x) (14)
The reason that why sphere projection helps in generat-
ing large-margin features is as follows. To maximize (12),
the optimizer pursuits a large value for the expectation term
Ep(z′|xi)[log q(yi|z′)]. As each z′ ∼ p(z′|xi) in the term is
randomly sampled from the surface of the hypersphere, if the
centers of inter-class hyperspheres are too close to each other,
those z′ sampled from different classes would easily crash to-
gether, leading to low log q(y|z′) values. As a consequence,
the optimizer would drive the surface of these hyperspheres
to be far way from each other and ultimately, resulting in a
large angular margin between their centers (Figure 2.b).
In practice, we can compute the gradient of (12) as follows.
Denote W = {Wf ,Wg} as the parameters to be optimized:
• Likelihood term. We compute it by the reparameterization
trick [Kingma and Welling, 2013]. Let u ∼ Usphere(0, 1)
be the sample randomly drawn from the surface of an unit
sphere. Each sample z′ ∼ p(z′|xi) can be rewritten as:
z′ ∼ p(z′|xi) ⇔ z′ = r(xi) · u+ c(xi)
where r and c are defined in (14). We can then rewritten
the gradient of the expectation term as:
∇WEz′∼p(z′|xi)
[
log q(yi|z′)
]
= Eu∼Usphere(0,1)
[
∇W log q(yi|r(xi)u+ c(xi))
]
≈ 1
m
m∑
l=1
∇W log q(yi|riul + ci), ul ∼ Usphere(0, 1)
where, to obtain u ∼ Usphere(0, 1), one can simply first
sample v ∼ N (0, I), then get u by u = v/‖v‖.
• KL term. This term can be computed easily since both
p(z|xi) and r(z) are Gaussian. Here, as in DVIB, we as-
sume that the matrix Λ(xi) in p(z|xi) is diagonal, yielding
∇WKL
[
p(z|xi)‖q(z)
]
=
1
2
∇W
[
log det(Λ(xi)) + Tr(Λ(xi)) + ‖µ(xi)‖22
]
=
1
2
∇W
[ k∑
l
log Λl,l(xi) +
k∑
l
Λl,l(xi) + ‖µ(xi)‖22
]
Unifying results from both terms yields the gradient∇WL′.
Adversarial learning. The second modification in our model
is to actively learn with extra adversarial samples. We found
this strategy particularly useful for further improving the fea-
ture robustness and discrminativity when incorporating with
the sphere projection operation. In this work, we construct
the adversarial sample x′ for each training sample x by the
fast gradient sign method [Goodfellow et al., 2014]:
x′ = x+  · ∇xL
′
‖∇xL′‖ (15)
where ∇xL′ is the gradient of the learning objective w.r.t x,
 is a small ‘permutation factor’ taken as  = 0.1. Therefore
x′ is constructed such that it causes the value of the objective
function to change the most quickly. In our method, the effect
of learning with these adversarial samples can be understood
as that they cause the hyperspheres of different classes to ‘os-
cillate’ around their initial positions. As the center of these
hyperspheres can only move on the surface of a hypersphere,
this makes them easily crash with each other during optimiza-
tion (Figure 2.c). To avoid this, the optimizer would have to
learn to stop such oscillations as well as increases the inter-
class margin (Figure 2.d). Note that the computation of∇xL′
in (15) can be done in a similar way as in∇WL′.
Algorithm 1 DVSP Training
Input: Biometric data pairs {(xi, yi)}ni=1
Output: Network weights W = {Wf ,Wg}
Hyperparamters: IB factor β, projection radius R
1: sample {ul}ml=1 ∼ Usphere(0, 1) ;
2: while not converge do
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: construct adversarial sample x′i from xi by (15);
5: end for
6: compute ∇WL′ with {(xi,x′i, yi)}ni=1 and {ul}ml=1
7: update weights: W← Adam(W,∇WL′)
8: end while
9: returnW
The whole training procedure of the proposed deep vari-
ational sphere projection (DVSP) network is summarized in
Algorithm 1. An overview of the full pipeline of the proposed
feature extraction framework is given in Figure 3, where we
will first use pre-processing and CNN to extract preliminary
features before subsequent learning. After training, we take
z′ in (10) as the feature of x, and compare two biometrics by
the cosine distance between their features.
Figure 4: The robustness heatmap for casting adversarial attacks in each method for the MNIST dataset.
4 Experiments
This section setups a set of experiments to ascertain the effec-
tiveness of the proposed DVSP method.
4.1 Setup
Evaluation metric. We will be using the following metrics
for performance evaluation:
• Recognition performance. We assess this by the equal error
rate (EER) of the features. EER is the point where the false
positive rate (FPR) and the false negative rate (FNR) are
equal. The FPR and FNR values are calculated as:
FPR =
nFP
nFP + nTN
, FNR =
nFN
nFN + nTP
(16)
where nTP , nFP , nTN , nFN are the number of true pos-
itive match, false positive match, true negative match and
false negative match in the database respectively. A lower
EER indicates a better FPR under the same FNR and hence
a better recognition performance.
• Feature robustness. This metric measures how robust the
feature extractor is against adversarial attacks. We compute
this metric by averaging the robustness index Hk,l in (4)
over all pairs of classes:
RI =
2
nc(nc − 1)
nc∑
l 6=k
nc∑
k=1
Hk,l (17)
where nc is the number of different individuals (classes) in
the database. For example, if there are 10 individuals, we
will calculate 10×92 = 45 pairs ofHk,l values in (17).
Baselines. We will compare the proposed method with the
following approaches:
• Deep Variational Information Bottleneck (DVIB) [Alemi
et al., 2017] is a representation learning framework that
extracts robust, highly discriminative features via the IB
principle. In this work we adapt DVIB from classification
tasks to the context of biometric recognition and as such it
serves as the predecessor of our method.
• Center-loss [Wen et al., 2016] is a powerful method for
face recognition. It learns large-margin features by making
points in each class to collapse towards the class center.
• SphereFace [Liu et al., 2017] is another state-of-the-art
method for face recognition. Similar to our method it
projects the features onto the surface of a hypersphere.
The difference is that it learns features by the softmax loss
whereas ours is by the IB principle.
All baselines as well as the proposed method adopt the
same CNN as in [Liu et al., 2017], which is comprised of 20
layers. The IB factor β as well as the projection radius R in
the proposed method are selected by 5-fold cross-validation
such that it achieves the best balance between EER and RI.
All neural networks are trained by Adam [Kingma and Ba,
2014] with its default settings.
4.2 Results
Experiments onMNIST dataset. We use this relatively sim-
ple dataset as a conceptual demonstration of the problem con-
sidered in this work. The MNIST dataset contains 60,000 im-
ages of hand-written digits from 0 to 9. In this experiment,
we treat every digit as an individual in the biometric recogni-
tion system. Therefore there are 10 different individuals with
6,000 images for each. We use the first 50,000 samples for
training and the left 10,000 for testing.
Figure 4 visualizes the ’robustness heatmap’ of each
method in this dataset. Each entry in the heatmap represents
how hard it is to cast adversarial attacks between two classes
i.e the value of Hk,l. A brighter color of the entry indicates
a larger Hk,l value and hence a higher difficulty. For exam-
ple, the entry at the 4-th row and the 6-th column indicates
the difficulty to attack between digit 3 and digit 5. Note that
the average of the non-diagonal entries in the heatmap makes
up the robustness index RI in (17). It can be seen from the
heatmap that the proposed DVSP method arguably achieves
better robustness than any other methods among almost all
classes pairs. MostHk,l values in the proposed DVSP method
are above 2 but are below 1 in other methods. This indicates
that it is nearly twice difficult to cast adversarial attacks in
our method. We further discover that such difficulties indeed
depend on the nature of the two classes. For example, the val-
ues ofH4,9 andH3,5 are significantly much lower than other
pairs. This coincides with the prior that it requires less efforts
to cast adversarial attacks between similar classes.
Table 1: The EER and the RI values on the MNIST dataset.
DVIB Center-loss SphereFace DVSP
EER (×0.01) 1.267 1.562 2.146 0.725
RI 1.111 1.245 1.299 2.292
Table 1 further summarizes the EER and RI values of each
method, from which we clearly see that the proposed DVSP
method outperforms the other ones in both terms of recogni-
tion performance and feature robustness.
Original Center. DVIB SphereFace DVSP Target Original Center. DVIB SphereFace DVSP Target
Figure 5: Visualizing the adversarial samples constructed by adversarial attacks in each method for the CASIA/LFW dataset. It can be seen
that the adversarial samples in DVSP (the 5th columns) are significantly different from the original images (the 1st columns).
Experiments on CASIA/LFW dataset. In this part, we
further evaluate the efficacy of the proposed method on a
real-world face recognition problem. In particular, we con-
sider the case that the individuals (classes) in the training set
are disjoint from that in the test set; a common situation in
real-world applications. Here, the CASIA-webface dataset
[Yi et al., 2014] will serve as the training set and the LFW
dataset [Huang et al., 2008] will serve as the test set. There
are 494,414 images of 10,575 individuals in CASIA-webface
and 13233 images of 5,749 individuals in the LFW dataset.
Each of these images is pre-processed by the face alignment
method [Zhang et al., 2016] before subsequent processing.
In Figure 5, we show four groups of images x1,x2 as well
as their adversarial samples x˜1, x˜2 constructed by adversar-
ial attacks. In each group, we display the original images in
the first column, their corresponding adversarial samples in
each method in the middle columns, and the target images in
the last column. The first row in each pair shows the case
x1 v.s x2 whereas the second row shows the case x2 v.s x1.
These adversarial samples are found by the modified Carlini-
Wanger attack described in section 2. It can be seen from the
figure that the differences between the adversarial samples
and their origin image are visually imperceptible in other ap-
proaches but are significant in the proposed DVSP method.
The difference between the adversarial sample and the orig-
inal image in DVSP is so large that it clearly deviates from
natural human faces (e.g see the stripes on the faces in the 5-
th columns in each group). This demonstrates that it requires
much higher efforts to attack the proposed DVSP method than
other methods i.e it is more robust to adversarial attacks.
Table 2: The EER and the RI values on the CASIA/LFW dataset.
DVIB Center-loss SphereFace DVSP
EER (×0.01) 2.133 2.000 1.933 1.593
RI 1.393 0.612 0.572 4.602
Table 2 further summarizes the EER and RI values of each
method in this problem. Expectedly we see that the proposed
DVSP achieves a better trade-off between recognition perfor-
mance and feature robustness, with its RI index nearly three
times higher than other methods and its EER much lower.
5 Conclusions
Adversarial attacks is a hot research topic in recent machine
learning but has not been extensively studied within the con-
text of biometric recognition. In this work, we extend cur-
rent analysis in adversarial attacks from label space to feature
space and discuss its effects on biometric recognition tasks.
We discover that many state-of-the-art solutions in biomet-
ric recognition are indeed vulnerable to adversarial attacks
and can be easily fooled. To defend such attacks, we de-
velop a deep, information-theoretic framework to extract ro-
bust yet discriminative biometric features. The framework
builds upon the recent deep variational information bottle-
neck method [Alemi et al., 2017] but is carefully adapted to
biometric recognition tasks. Experiments on a toy dataset
as well as a real-world face recognition problem demon-
strates the efficacy of the proposed framework. To the best
of our knowledge, only few works like [Duan et al., 2018;
Xu et al., 2018] have considered adversarial attacks in the
feature space but they have not studied the case of biomet-
ric recognition. Our work thus broadens the research scope
of adversarial attacks and biometric recognition and suggests
new research directions in both these fields.
Throughout our work, we mainly focus on the L2 attack
case where we measure the similarity between the adversarial
sample and the original image by their Euclidean distance. It
is therefore of great interest to generalize our analysis to other
cases such as L0 attack [Papernot et al., 2016] and L∞ attack
[Warde-Farley and Goodfellow, 2016] for completeness. An-
other direction worth exploration is to test the effectiveness
of the proposed framework on other biometric modalities not
dealt with herein, including irises, voices and fingerprints.
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